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Abstract 
According to the life-cycle theory, countries with high and rising youth ratios or high and rising 
old-age ratios tend to have low savings relative to investment, which depresses their capital 
outflows. This paper puts life-cycle theory to the test and studies the impact of demographic 
change on international capital flows in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the 
Southern European countries Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal (GISP). These two regions are 
asymmetric in that MENA has a young population whereas the population of GISP has been 
ageing rapidly. Moreover, MENA has a lower standard of living an is a much more closed 
economy, which may effect the ability to save and its impact on cross-border capital flows. The 
empirical analyses in this paper cover the period 1980-2011 and partly support the life-cycle 
theory for these two regions. Youth rates depressed domestic savings significantly in both the 
MENA and GISP regions, while ageing as well as population growth had a positive impact in the 
GISP region. Also, domestic savings significantly caused international capital flows. 
Key words: Demography, international capital flows, savings, ageing.  
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Some theory on domestic savings and international capital flows 
According to the life-cycle theory, young and old generations consume more than they save, 
while working-age generations save more than they consume. People of working age save for 
their retirement or, in cases of pay-as-you-go pension systems, for the currently retired 
generation. In contrast, retired people consume more than they save because they no longer 
have an incentive to save. This theory has been shown to apply to developed economies (see for 
instance Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954, and Lee et al., 2006), but far less information is 
available for emerging economies.  
According to other studies in the literature, population ageing is expected to have a profound 
effect on international capital markets (see for instance Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) and Bryant 
(2005) or Taylor and Williamson (1994)). The reasoning is that demographic change alters the 
time path of aggregate savings within each country and, in return, in open economies, impact 
international capital flows. This process may be amplified if pension reform shifts old-age 
provision towards more pre-funding, as is the case in many developed economies. While the 
patterns of population ageing are similar in most countries, timing and initial conditions differ 
substantially across countries.  
Hence, because capital is internationally mobile, population ageing will effect capital flows 
between countries. These effects influence the rate of return to capital and interact with the 
demand for capital in production and labour supply. Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) show, by means 
of an overlapping generations model, that capital flows shifting from fast-ageing regions to 
other countries can be substantial but the trend is likely to reverse when households start dis-
saving.   
In theory, what matters for the rate of saving is actually the rate of growth of incomes (Deaton, 
2005) not the level of income, as long as the population of poorer countries save the same share 
of their income as those in rich countries. If populations and incomes increase, young people 
will save more than older people dis-save. If populations shrink, aggregate savings will de-
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cumulate and countries even need to attract money from abroad via international markets. In 
an open economy, either a saving economy or a dissaving economy will effect the country’s 
international capital flows. 
To what extent does this hold for developed or emerging economies? Countries with developing 
economies still have relatively young populations. Although the working-age populations are 
large, savings ratios may be low due to a lower standard of living. Moreover, people are more 
likely to spend and invest money domestically than abroad because these economies are more 
closed. Developed economies that are more likely to have ageing populations will have saved 
more but are life-cycle hypothesis expects they will start dis-saving once the baby-boom 
generations retire. As Bryant (2005) discussed, the optimistic view was that capital will flow 
from the North to the South, in other words, from the developed economies to the developing 
economies, or from the ageing to the young populations. There are thus strong asymmetries in 
demographic structure, in terms of economies’ openness as well as the destiny of domestic 
savings. Because these factors strengthen each other, the expectation is that relatively more 
capital has been flowing from the North to the South until the baby boom generations retire. 
So how well does theory translate into practice? There are many assumptions in these theories 
that may not hold in practice. For instance, the working-age generations in developed 
economies may have saved very little. Or, they may be saving but investing these fund 
domestically instead of abroad. Also, the working-age population in developed economies may 
be able to save a lot more because of an unequal distribution of wealth, possibly by being in 
possession of natural resources or due to corruption. .  
This paper takes an empirical approach and looks at the empirical evidence at hand to test the 
impact of demographic change on domestic saving and on gross capital flows. I study the MENA-
region and the GISP-region around the Mediterranean, i.e. the South of Europe. The MENA 
region’s population is growing and thus relatively young. In sharp contrast, South-Europe 
(GISP) has been ageing rapidly, due to relatively low fertility rates and long longevity. The first 
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baby boom generations started retiring in 2010. The approach adopted in this paper is based 
directly on data about cross-border bank assets and tests for the impact of young- and old-age 
dependency rates. This approach is similar to the approach adopted by Narciso (2010) who 
studies OECD-countries and the analyses of Horioka and Terada-Hagiwara (2012) on Asian 
countries. The merit of this approach is in estimating instead of imposing impact factors, which 
is implicitly the case in calibrated overlapping generation models (see Börsch-Supan et al. 
(2006) or Marchiori (2011)).  Data-driven models in combination with more theory-driven 
models can study the impact of demographic changes from different angles and thus 
complement each other.  
The main aim of this study is to find out whether or not the demographic structural changes that 
differ widely between the two regions (MENA and GISP) effect the regions’ international capital 
flows significantly and, if so, to what extent. This can provide us with a valuable piece of 
information in order to understand better the present and the future international capital flows. 
It also sheds light on the issue of money flowing between rich and poor countries (Lucas, 1990). 
Stylized facts 
As explained before, this study distinguishes between the South- and North-Mediterranean 
region, referred to as the MENA and the GISP respectively. MENA includes here the northwest to 
the northeast Africa and the Middle East: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, the occupied 
Palestinian territory, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. GISP includes the southeast to the southwest of 
Europe: Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal.  
I first study the population size of these two regions. The population of the MENA was about 50 
million in 1950 and quadrupled in 2010 to 200 million. According to United Nations projections 
(see ) expectations are that the population will grow further to almost 300 million Figure 1
people by the year 2065. Ceteris paribus, the population is expected to decrease because of 
lower fertility rates. The GISP economies, which already have lower fertility and higher 
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longevity rates due to their higher welfare levels, are expected to reach their peak in population 
size sooner, in 2030, after which the population will shrink steadily to 118 million by 2100. 
After the baby boom generations, those born in two to three decades just after the second World 
War, far less children were born. By consequence, replacement rates were not met for which 
reason the current new born generations is not as numerous as the old age generations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1   Evolution of population size in GISP and MENA countries 
 
Source: Author based on the United Nations population statistics. 
Note: MENA includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. GISP includes Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
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However, the structure of these populations is more relevant to our analyses. Life-cycle theory 
differentiates between young and old generations that, according to this theory, consume more 
than they save, while the working-age population saves more than it consumes. A division of the 
population into these three groups provides more insight. Let us assume that the young are 
defined as those below 15 years of age, working-age group are those between 15 and 65 and the 
old generation are those above 65. Figure 2 shows the distribution for three points in time:  
2010, 2050 and 2100. The panels on the left show the aggregate population of the MENA in 
comparison to GISP on the right and changes in of the population structure over time are shown 
in the panels going down. 
This figure shows, that because the MENA previously had far more numerous young than old 
generations for decades in a row, it had a high working-age population, by 2010 (see also 
Peeters, 2011, on the specific case of Egypt). This gradually changes over the years and the 
pyramid structure changes to a bulb structure by 2100, indicating that the MENA region is 
facing an ageing problem even though it may take several decades.  In contrast, the GISP region 
has a kite population structure in 2010. The numerous people in the cohorts between the age of 
35 and 65 reflect the baby boom when fertility rates were relatively higher than the years 
during and before World War II and the three decades thereafter. This baby boom is causing the 
population bulb structure in 2050, with relatively larger old-age than working-age populations. 
In the year 2100, as the last figure in Figure 2 shows, the GISP population is stable as there are 
no cohorts much larger or smaller in size than average, apart from the oldest generations (at the 
top). 
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Figure 2   Population structure from a pyramid or a kite towards a bulb 
  
  
  
Source: Author based on the United Nations population statistics. 
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Figure 3   Old-age and young-age dependency rates 
 
Source: Author based on the United Nations population statistics. 
Note: The young-age dependency rate is calculated as the number of persons aged from 0 to 15 
as a percentage of the working-age population, which is defined as persons aged 15 to 65. The 
old-age dependency rate is the number of persons above 65 as a percentage of the working age 
population. 
Ageing in the MENA region is striking. As Figure 3 shows, the old-age dependency rates, defined 
as old-age generations as a percentage of working-age populations, rises from almost 8% in 
2010 to 48% in 2100. This is thus an enormous rise, although it will be a gradual development. 
Ageing in the GISP region peaks at 61% in 2050. This implies that there will be more than 3 
persons older than 65 for every 5 persons that are of working age in 2050, instead of 3 to 10 in 
2010. After 2050 the old-age dependency rates are expected to stabilise. 
The young-age dependency rates - defined as the young generations as a percentage of the 
working age population - peaked at 90% in 1975 in the MENA and 41% in 1970 for the GISP 
region. Both young-age dependency rates are expected to converge to around 30% in the course 
of time between 2050 and 2100.  
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Figure 4  Domestic savings ratios 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the IMF World Economic Outlook Spring 2012. 
Note: These are averages across the countries. The occupied Palestinian territory is not included 
in the MENA-group due to the lack of data. 
Domestic savings are a relevant factor according to life-cycle theory. Young and old people tend 
to save far less than working-age populations, or even dis-save. As Figure 4 confirms, one can 
observe a positive trend in domestic savings in the MENA countries, up until the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis and the Arab revolution that started at the end of 2010. In contrast, 
savings in the GISP countries declined strongly in the period 1990 until 2010. This refers to 
gross savings, comprising public and private savings, expressed as a percentage of GDP. The life-
cycle theory supports these trends.  Falling young-age dependency rates in the MENA region 
leads to higher savings as the working-age population increases in relative terms. The GISP 
region, with strongly rising old-age dependency rates dis-saves more and more over the years. 
These are thus stylized facts, seemingly in support of the theory. 
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Several studies could be mentioned here, to interpret the facts. Mason (1987), for instance, 
showed for 79 countries during the period 1960-80 a significant positive impact of declining 
young age dependency rates on domestic savings. At the same time, slowly rising longevity 
raises domestic savings rates according to Bloom, Canning and Graham, (2003), tested for Asian 
and African countries. These factors could explain the rise in MENA savings. An explanation for 
the declining GISP savings rates could be found in the predominantly rising old age dependency 
rates. 
However, several non-demographic factors will be at play here, such as also the consequences of 
the global financial crisis in 2009 and likewise the sovereign debt crisis are likely to have 
influenced the outcomes.  
According to the life-cycle theory domestic savings impacts international capital flows. The term 
international capital flows is rather broad as it encompasses a variety of different money flows 
that cross country borders, such as foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, remittances, 
bank loans and bank deposits among others. The majority of these flows go through the banking 
system. For this reason I focus here in this study on cross-border bank assets from the MENA 
and the GISP vis-à-vis other countries in the world.  
Using BIS-data,  shows the cross-border aggregate assets for the full period 1980-2011 Figure 5
for both regions. As follows, both regions show increasing cross-border assets, though for the 
GISP steadily during the whole period while for the MENA region more explosive up to the 
global crisis in 2008-09. After the global crisis the savings of MENA sharply contract from 60% 
of GDP to around 20%.   
For the MENA region the alignment of domestic savings ( ) and cross-border assets Figure 4
( ) seems more in line with theory than the developments in the GISP region. Despite Figure 5
the fact that domestic savings dropped in the latter, cross-border assets rose. However, these 
graphs only show the regions’ averages and no causality. Other factors will also have influenced 
cross-border capital flows, such as the higher degree of globalisation.  
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Figure 5  Cross-border capital flows 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Bank for International Settlements December 2011. 
Note: These are simple averages across the countries. The occupied Palestinian territory is not 
included in the MENA-group due to the lack of data. 
 
Empirical analyses 
In using the individual country information, by estimating panel regressions, and hence 
econometric causality testing, we obtain more information. To analyse the determinants of 
savings and cross-border assets, the subsequent econometric model is estimated for both 
regions:   
                                                                            
                                                      
 (Equation 1-2) 
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) 
The first equation explains the domestic savings as a percentage of GDP (denoted as s) by the 
savings ratio in the past, demographic variables and GDP per capita (GDP). Demographic 
variables are the old-age dependency ratio (oadr) and the young-age dependency ratio (yadr), 
as presented in . Also the growth of the population (       , see Figure 3 ) is included. Figure 1
Higher population growth may lead to higher savings, as it is likely that it implies the presence 
of relatively more young or more workers (due to immigration). The second equation explains 
the cross-border capital flows as a percentage of nominal GDP (cf), by the cross-border capital 
flows in the past, a country’s degree of openness (openness) and domestic savings.  
Subscript t represents the year and subscript j represents the country. For the MENA-
regressions this implies that j=Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon or Syria 
and for the GISP j=Greece, Italy, Spain or Portugal. For both the MENA and GISP countries there 
are thus each two panel regressions: one for domestic savings and one for the cross-border 
capital flows. The panel contains the cross-section of countries (eight for MENA and four for 
GISP), along with a time dimension that can cover up to 30 years (from 1980 to 2011).  
The econometric model specifies further that the domestic savings and cross-border capital 
flows are explained by a common constant ( ) and a country-specific constant (  ) for each 
region. The symbols             and  represent parameters to be estimated. Apart from the 
fixed effects (             ), the parameters are not country or time specific because of the lack 
of degrees of freedom in running recursive regressions that we use to track the changes in 
estimated reaction coefficients (see ). Figure 6
Most relevant to our analyses is the impact of the demographic variables on domestic savings. 
Estimates for the  ’s provide us information on these reaction coefficients. Higher old- and 
young-age dependency rates are expected to affect domestic savings, for instance, according to 
the life-cycle theory. In addition, the impact of domestic savings on cross-border capital flows 
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(parameter  ) is of high relevance. A significant positive parameter is expected according to the 
theory, as in this case domestic savings push up cross-border capital flows.  
Each equation has a disturbance term, indicated by  . We will assume these terms to be 
normally distributed with a zero mean and constant variance. The estimation method used is 
Ordinary Least Squares where period weights are used for the covariance matrix. This method 
also allows us to test for fixed or random effects, and some testing for country-specific reaction 
parameter estimates.  
In order not to run into endogeneity problems, i.e. causality running from the endogenous 
variable to the exogenous variables which could bias our estimates, I include - apart from the 
demographic variables - the explanatory variables with one year’s lag. For instance, domestic 
savings of country j in year t may effect domestic GDP per capita in year t, but cannot effect 
        . The same holds for the cross-border capital flows and domestic savings in the second 
equation. In this way the exogenous variables are independent of the error term. The 
demographic variables are determined by other factors (culture, religion, history, genetics) and 
thus measured at time t, without a risk of running into endogeneity problems. 
The sources for the data are the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the United Nations 
(UN) and the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook of Spring 2012 (IMF WEO). 
The BIS provides quarterly information on the international exposure per country of 
international banks that report to the BIS. In order to measure the cross-border bank assets of 
the MENA and GISP countries, I use the exposure of these BIS reporting banks on each of the 
MENA and GISP countries (see also Peeters and Sabri, 2012b). Demographic information per 5-
year cohort is available from the UN for each fifth year and split into the working-age, young and 
the old generations (see also  until Figure 3 in this study and Peeters and Groot, 2012a, Figure 1
or Groot and Peeters, 2011). The data on GDP, GDP per capital and domestic savings come from 
the IMF and are annual. As the frequency of the original series differ, I use the data at the annual 
level, therefore the end-of-the-year figures from the BIS until 2011. December 2011 is the last 
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available and thus the cut-off date of this paper. I interpolate the UN demographic figures from 
5-year to annual series without loss of information as demographic developments evolve 
relatively slowly and smoothly. Our dataset, thus, consists of annual time series for each 
country, the exception being the occupied Palestinian territory, which is not included in the IMF 
WEO. Our measure of openness is the overall KOF-index that is available for each country in our 
dataset. The full sample period is 1980-2011.  in Appendix 1 reports summary statistics Table 2
of the data.  presents the estimation results for the four panels for the period 1990-Table 1
2011. It follows that the goodness-of-fit is overall high, ranging from 0.80 for the domestic 
savings equation of the MENA region to even 0.94 for the domestic savings equations for the 
GISP region. The fixed effects are highly significant in each of the four panels. The same holds for 
the lagged dependent variables. Interestingly, the lagged domestic savings have a high point 
estimate (0.68 and 0.80 for the MENA and GISP region, respectively) in the domestic savings 
equations. The same holds for the lagged cross-border capital flows (0.75 and 0.62 for the 
MENA and GISP region, respectively) in the cross-border capital flows equations. This indicates 
that domestic savings and cross-border capital flows are highly persistent. 
As emphasized before, most relevant for our analyses is the impact of the demographic 
variables on domestic savings and the impact of domestic savings on cross-border capital flows. 
As follows, the old-age dependency rates were not significant during this sample period, in 
contrast to the young-age dependency rates, even in both regions. The young-age dependency 
rates depressed domestic savings, in agreement with the life-cycle theory. As we have a specific 
and rather long sample here, from 1990 to 2011, we also ran recursive regressions on these 
reaction coefficients. As ageing set in more slowly than the fall of fertility rates, the estimates 
from subsamples can give us more reliable information. After all, the baby boom generations 
started retiring only in 2010, so at the end of our sample, and up until that period more money 
will have been saved in the more developed GISP region where old-age retirement provisions 
are in place.  
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Table 1  Estimation results from panel regressions 
 MENA GISP 
 Domestic savings Cross-border 
capital flows 
Domestic savings Cross-border 
capital flows 
     0.68** 0.42* 0.80** -0.52** 
      -1.52  -0.11  
      -0.40**  -0.26*  
         1.94*  1.00*  
          -0.10**  -0.06**  
       0.75**  0.62** 
           -0.27  -0.01 
constant 
 
1.2** 0.1 0.7** 0.2** 
fixed effects significant significant significant significant 
     
           0.80 0.91 0.94 0.88 
sample period 1990-2011 1990-2011 1990-2011 1990-2011 
     
Note: The endogenous variable is either domestic savings as percentage of GDP (s) or cross-
border capital flows (cf). The exogenous variables, as presented in the first column, are 
domestic savings (s), the old- and the young-age dependency rate (oadr and yadr), the growth 
rate of the population (       ), GDP per capita (GDP), cross-border capital flows (cf) and 
the country’s openness (see ). The estimation strategy is explained in the text. * (Equation 1-2)
indicates that the parameter is significant at the 5%-level and ** at the 1%-level. All statistical 
details are available upon request. 
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 gives the results of the recursive regressions, with a window of 17 observations Figure 6
shifting over the full sample 1980-2011. The first graph shows that the estimated reaction 
coefficient of the old-age dependency rate on domestic savings was not significant for the 
MENA. For the GISP, however, old-age dependency rates were positively effecting domestic 
savings until the most recent subsamples (see first graph on the right). This is in full agreement 
with the theory. Before retirement the working age baby boom generations saved significantly 
in the GISP region. The middle graphs show the estimated reaction coefficients of the young-age 
dependency rates for both regions. According to the theory, these rates depressed domestic 
savings significantly, for the full period. 
Apart from the dependency rates, we also included the population growth. As follows from the 
estimations as presented in Table 1 and the recursive regressions in  , population Figure 6
growth impacts domestic savings positively in the GISP region, and to a lesser extent, in the 
MENA region for some periods. In sum, therefore, the demographic variables are relevant to 
explain domestic savings. 
Like Horioka and Hagiwara (2012), who estimate the determinants of domestic savings for 
developing Asian countries, we took into account the income level. This term is highly 
significant for both regions (see ), as also found by Park and Shin (2009) and Bosworth Table 1
and Chodorow-Reich (2007). High growth creates higher saving that will feed back through 
capital accumulation. However, experimenting with Horioka and Hagiwara’s convex 
combination that models that higher income levels after a certain point contribute positively to 
domestic savings is not supported by our empirical data on the MENA and GISP region for the 
sample that we have under investigation here. 
Along with our evidence that young-age dependency rates depressed domestic savings in both 
regions, that population growth stimulated domestic savings in the GISP region, and that old-
age dependency rates positively affected domestic savings in this region in the further past but 
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are fading out at the end of our sample (2011), domestic savings impact cross-border capital 
flows also significantly. This follows from the cross-border capital flows equations in . Table 1
For the MENA region domestic savings push up these capital flows, according to the theory. The 
estimated coefficient is 0.42. However, for the GISP region we find a peculiar, negative impact 
(of -0.52).  
This latter result is hard to understand and certainly not according to our expectations. 
Moreover, it is quite robust as it holds for subsamples. Regressions with country-specific 
reaction coefficients for this effect of domestic savings on cross-border capital flows point out 
that these highly negative significant effects hold for both Greece and Portugal. During the full 
period 1980-2011 their domestic savings as a percentage of GDP has been falling (see also 
). Despite this drop, cross-border capital flows increased (Figure 4 ). Government Figure 5
savings dropped sharply, probably partly because of ageing, worsened after 2008 because of the 
sovereign debt crisis. To what extent private savings dropped, and which cross-border 
transactions (assets) increased because of these domestic developments cannot be determined 
on the basis of our information here. More detailed information is needed to investigate this 
causality in-depth. To the best of my knowledge the literature on domestic savings, so far, 
provides little to no information on the direct empirical link of domestic savings on 
international capital flows.  
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Figure 6  Recursive estimated reactions on domestic savings 
 
 
 
Note: The graphs contain the estimates of the reactions coefficients obtained by estimating the 
panels as specified in (1-2) for MENA and GISP respectively, by using the windows of 
observations as indicated on the x-axis. As indicated, each window contains 17 observations, 
apart from the first (due to lagged variables) that ranged from 1982 to 1996. The last window is 
from 1995 to 2011. The bands are 95% confidence intervals.  
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Summary, policy reflections and conclusions 
 This paper identifies the demographic differences between the South-Mediterranean countries 
(MENA) and the North-Mediterranean countries (GISP). While the North ages rapidly after 2010 
and is facing a decreasing population size in 2035, the South still has a relatively young 
population. However, it is important to realize that the South-Mediterranean region is also 
ageing and population decline is expected to kick in around 2065. According to the life-cycle 
theory and studies on ageing, these population structure changes are likely to have an impact on 
international capital flows. 
The results in this paper partly support this hypothesis, for both regions. In the empirical 
analyses we test for the significance of young- and old-age dependency rates, as well as 
population growth on domestic savings during the period 1980-2011. The results strongly point 
out that young-age dependency rates negatively affected domestic savings for both the MENA 
and the GISP region. The old-age dependency rate hardly impacted domestic savings in the 
MENA region, while it significantly positively affected domestic savings in the GISP region, 
though the impact decreased at the end of the sample where the baby boom generations started 
to retire. Extrapolating this result for the next decades could imply that ageing in the GISP 
region depresses domestic savings, which would be in line with the life-cycle theory. We need a 
longer sample of retired baby boom generations to proof this. The study further points out that 
population growth also impacted domestic savings in the GISP region during 1995-2011, 
positively and robustly.  
Demographic structure has thus evidently been causal to domestic savings in the MENA and 
GISP regions. The direct influence of domestic savings on international capital flows is harder to 
determine. Measuring international capital flows as cross-border bank assets, we find a 
significant pass-through. According to these results, the ageing and de-juvenating of the MENA 
and GISP regions, though at different speeds and in a different timing, may thus be expected to 
further impact domestic savings and hence international capital flows. 
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Appendix 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics 
 MENA GISP 
Domestic savings, % GDP 23.3 19.4 
 (11.8 ; 35.0) (15.6 ; 21.2) 
Cross-border bank assets, % GDP 27.5 
(3.9 ; 153.7) 
15.0 
(12.8 ; 29.0) 
Cross-border bank asset, per capita 42 
(3 ; 205) 
233 
(218 ; 318) 
Old-age dependency rate, % 7.3 22.7 
 (5.0 ; 9.9) (21.7 ; 24.3) 
Young-age dependency rate, % 68.9 27.7 
 (55.7 ; 84.7) (25.0 ; 30.0) 
Population growth, % 2.4 0.5 
 (1.3 ; 3.5) (0.2 ; 0.8) 
Income per capita, purchasing 17,900 
(14,600 ; 20,800) 
5,000 
(2,500 ; 10,700) power parity 
Source: Author based on BIS, IMF and UN data sources. 
Note: The statistics are averages across samples and over the full sample 1980-2011, where the 
figures in brackets list the minimum and maximum sample average across the countries. Ratios 
are calculated as the simple average across the countries.  
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